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Abstract
Estimates on the effect of job contact method—i.e., informal versus formal search—on wage offers vary
considerably across studies, with some of them finding a positive correlation between getting help from
informal connections and obtaining high-paying jobs, while others finding a negative one. In this paper, I
investigate the sources of discrepancies in these empirical results. Using a formal job search framework, I
derive an equilibrium wage distribution which reveals that the informal search yields for some groups higher
and for some others lower wages than formal search. The key result is the existence of nonmonotonicities
in wage offers. Two potential sources of these nonmonotonicities exist: (i) peer effects and (ii) unobserved
worker heterogeneity in terms of the inherent cost of maintaining connections within a productive infor-
mal network. The model predicts that a greater degree of unobserved heterogeneity tilts the estimates
toward producing a positive correlation between informal search and higher wages, whereas stronger peer
influences tend to yield a negative correlation. This conclusion informs the empirical research in the sense
that identification of the true correlation between job contact methods and wage offers requires a careful
assessment of the unobserved heterogeneity and peer influences in the relevant sample.
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1 Introduction
What rationalizes the choice between using versus not using informal job search channels is not
well understood in the literature.1 Neither is it often well-grounded why some groups rely more
on these social contacts than others, nor why the patterns of wages vary across these groups.
The well-known stylized fact that around a half of all new jobs are filled through social contacts
in major developed economies throws the endeavor to investigate the connections between the
choice of job search method and the associated labor market outcomes into sharp relief.2
In this paper, I pose the question “whether informal search methods generate higher or lower
wage offers than formal search.” There is a divide in the empirical literature, with some
studies finding a positive correlation between getting help from informal connections and
obtaining high-paying jobs, while others finding a negative one.3 I attempt to put together a
coherent theoretical story that can shed some light on this puzzle. My purpose is to construct
a theoretical model, using which one can practically disentangle the forces governing the
correlation between job contact methods and wage outcomes. Such a framework will inform
the empirical research about the potential avenues that can be followed in reconciling the
contradictory findings reported in the existing literature.
Using a discrete choice model of job search with worker heterogeneity and segmented markets,
I derive an equilibrium wage distribution which demonstrates that the jobs found through
informal methods pay for some groups higher and for some others lower wages than the jobs
found through formal methods.4 The key is the existence of nonmonotonicities in wage offers.
The main choice of the unemployed job searcher is to decide whether to search informally
1Formal sources of job information are the publicly available hiring channels such as newspaper ads, employment agencies,
union hiring services, and various other placement services. The informal sources include referrals from relatives, friends and
acquaintances, and direct/indirect contacts through social networks.
2See, for example, Rees (1966), Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan (1980), Holzer (1988), Marsden and Campbell (1990),
Granovetter (1995), Bewley (1999), Addison and Portugal (2002), and Ioannides and Loury (2004).
3See Ioannides and Loury (2004) for an extensive review of the related literature.
4Workers differ in terms of the inherent cost of maintaining connections with a productive informal network. Using formal
methods in job search is costless for all workers, whereas the cost of staying connected with an informal network is distributed
around zero. In other words, some groups have inherent a priori advantages that provide incentives to invoke informal contacts,
while others have disadvantages and are driven to rely on formal methods only. The following insight from Calvo-Armengol and
Jackson (2004) motivates the source of worker heterogeneity: if there are costs associated with remaining in a network, those
who have lower costs will be more willing to stay connected. The sources of these costs include skill maintenance, education, and
various opportunity costs. Similar references to cost heterogeneity are also provided in various studies, including Holzer (1988)
and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994).
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and/or formally. Those who choose to search via formal methods only receive a certain
equilibrium wage. Wages of those who choose to call their informal connections may be lower
or higher than the wage offer generated through formal search. In particular, I show that, at
the equilibrium, a certain fraction—say L ∈ [0, 1]—of informal searchers accept lower wages
than the formal methods can generate and the remaining ones—say H = 1−L ∈ [0, 1]—accept
higher wages. The main theoretical insight of the paper is the following. The relative sizes of
L and H are determined by two factors: unobserved heterogeneity in the cost of informal
search and the degree of peer effects in the relevant population.
The first prediction of the model is that a greater degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the
cost of informal search increases the likelihood of a positive correlation between using informal
search and earning high wages. This suggests that as the fraction of better-connected workers
increase in the population, informal search will be more likely to yield higher wages. Failing
to control for this unobserved heterogeneity element may lead to contradictory estimates de-
pending on which part of the population the sample represents. For example, Marmaros and
Sacerdote (2002), a breakthrough paper in the literature, document a positive correlations be-
tween earnings and informal contacts; but their sample consists of Darthmouth College seniors,
who are potentially much better-connected than a sample representing the whole population
in the United States. Simon and Warner (1992) also document a positive correlation using a
sample of individuals from the 1972 Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers.
This sample also potentially suffers from the same problem. Similarly, Rosenbaum, DeLuca,
Miller, and Roy (1999) find that the correlation between earnings and getting help from “close
relatives” tend to be positive as men aged from 19 to 28 years. This is again plagued with a
similar problem, because one becomes better connected as his/her close relatives—i.e., cousins,
brothers, sisters—get older and become better connected. Similar arguments also hold for the
papers reporting a negative correlation. For example, Elliot (1999) documents that workers
residing in some certain neighborhoods who find jobs through nonwhite contacts tend to re-
ceive low wage offers. Similarly, papers including Beggs and Hurlbert (1997), Mencken and
Winfield (2000), and Smith (2000) argue that jobs found through uneducated female contacts
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systematically pay lower wages than the jobs found through formal methods. These papers
tend to oversample individuals with poor connections. I conclude that failing to control for
unobserved heterogeneity (characterizing if the worker is well-connected or not) may lead to
misleading estimates of the sign of the correlation between informal contacts and earnings.5
The second potential source is social interactions (or peer effects). With peer effects, the
individual worker’s choice of the search method is affected from the choices of other workers
in the reference group or neighborhood [Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008)]. For example, an
unemployed worker who wants to work a large steel factory close to the neighborhood he/she
lives would tend to invoke his/her contacts working in this factory if a significant portion of
residents work in the same factory and if the norm is to search informally in the neighborhood.
This kind of connection patterns are generally observed in poor neighborhoods, where most
residents are blue-collar workers employed in a nearby factory. The model predicts that
stronger peer influences increase the likelihood of a negative correlation between earnings and
informal search. In other words, stronger peer effects make the workers at the lower end of
the informal job seekers rely on referrals more intensively. Thus, peer effects operate among
low wage earners. This result embodies another empirical suggestion: peer effects should also
be controlled for in applied work, beside unobserved heterogeneity.
There is a theoretical literature aiming to understand the economic foundations of the rela-
tionship between earnings and job contact methods. But, just as the empirical literature, the
theoretical results are also mixed. Early papers, including Saloner (1985) and Montgomery
(1991), find that job search through informal contacts leads to a better exchange of informa-
tion between the applicants and potential employers, thus it results in higher-quality matches
and the pay is higher. As opposed to this view, Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez (2010) show
that job search through informal connections may lead to inefficiencies as it may cause firms
to hire workers quickly and solely based on subjective or premature referrals.6 Both of these
5There are also studies reporting zero correlation [see Bridges and Villemez (1986), Holzer (1987), and Marsden and Gorman
(2001)], and both positive and negative correlations [see Antoninis (2006) and Pellizzari (2010)]. See Loury (2006) for an excellent
discussion of the sampling problems affecting the estimates in this literature.
6Fontaine (2008) argues that one’s informal network grows over the life cycle, which means that initial wage disadvantages
of search by informal contacts may be replaced with wage advantages as one gets older and accumulates more experience. This
view predicts that the correlations may also vary over the life cycle.
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views provide valuable insights into the problem under question. However, they fail to fully
explain the sources of discrepancies in the empirical results. My model presents a unifying
theoretical construct by bringing positive and negative correlations between wages and infor-
mal search together within a general equilibrium framework. The model is, therefore, capable
of disentangling the forces governing the sign and the magnitude of the empirical correlation
between earnings and informal connections.
In terms of the results, this paper is closest to Pellizzari (2010). Pellizzari builds a theoretical
model to argue that using informal methods can either lead to a wage penalty or a wage
premium. The model he develops is a simple three-period matching model, but the simplicity
comes at a cost: unemployed workers accept all offers and wage determination is exogenous in
nature. This paper pushes the frontier in this literature in the sense that it extends Pellizzari’s
work into a version of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides model, in which wages are endoge-
nously determined in a general equilibrium setting and workers are allowed to reject any offer
that they do not like. The main insights from the general equilibrium setting are that any
factor affecting the unemployed workers’ choices of searching formally versus informally also
affects the wage distribution and the strength of one’s connections enters the Nash bargain in
wage determination. This general equilibrium effects interact with the two factors I mention
above, unobserved heterogeneity and peer influences, in determining the relative sizes of L and
H in the economy, as well as which workers search informally and which ones search formally.
I show that Pellizzari’s main finding (that informal methods can either lead to a wage penalty
or a wage premium) holds in this general equilibrium setting too. Such a setup allows me to
derive sharp formulas for the distributions of equilibrium wages and unemployment rates. I
analyze the sources of wage penalties or premia by performing intuitive comparative statics
exercises.
In a more recent paper, Zaharieva (2012) also shows that positive and negative forces coexist
in the determination of the effect of job contact methods on wages. Specifically, she shows
that referrals have a positive effect on reservation wages (because better connected workers
can bargain higher wages), while there is also a negative effect due to negative selection (i.e.,
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the average productivity of a referred worker tends to be lower than the average productivity
at the market level). In a companion paper, Zaharieva (2013) demonstrates that wages are
ex-post bargained and can deviate (in both directions) from the posted wage depending on
the worker’s bargaining power.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sketches the main results and motivates the
model. Section 3 presents the model and its solution. The model presented in Section 3 rules
out peer influences for simplicity. Section 4 introduces peer effects and describes the effect of
social forces on wage differentials. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivation and Sketch of the Results
The key results is the existence of nonmonotonicities in wages. As explained above, the source
of these nonmonotonicities is twofold: worker heterogeneity and peer influences. Heterogeneity
comes from the differences across workers in terms of the inherent cost of maintaining connec-
tions with a productive informal network. This cost reflects how well-connected the workers
are. Those who are well-connected have inherent advantages in informal search, whereas those
who are not so well-connected will tend to rely on formal methods since the cost of accessing
a productive network is high for them. Peer influences are related to social forces diffusing
into individual-level decision making. Referrals and social interactions are the main forms of
these influences. Below I discuss how the existence of cost heterogeneity and peer effects can
be related to wage nonmonotonicities and how this relation can be associated with the results
documented in the empirical literature.
Figure (2.1) exemplifies the nature of the equilibrium outcomes that I focus on in this paper.
Workers differ in the cost of using informal contacts in job search and the cost of using formal
methods are the same for all workers. More precisely, the cost of using formal methods is set
to zero for all workers and the cost of using informal contacts is assumed—for simplicity—to
be symmetrically distributed around zero.7 Nonmonotonicities in wages can be clearly seen in
7To be concrete, I assume that z is normally distributed with mean zero. Existence of a cost distribution can be justified
as follows. It is argued in the literature that job search through informal networks are less costly and more productive. If this
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Figure 2.1: Wage distribution and nonmonotonicities. This figure describes the distribution of wages
and demonstrates the existence of nonmonotonicities in wages. The downward sloping portion of the wage
schedule describes the wages that informal job seekers receive, whereas the horizontal portion describes formal
job seekers’ wages. Obviously, a fraction of the informal job seekers earn lower and the rest earn higher wages
than the formal job seekers. This is only an example and the underlying parametrization is given in Section 3.
Figure (2.1). Worker types z—which defines the individual-level heterogeneity in the cost of
search via informal methods—are on the horizontal axis, wages w(z) are on the left-vertical
axis, and the probability density f(z) of worker types is on the right-vertical axis. First,
observe that, there exists an endogenous threshold type, zT , below which workers invoke
their informal contacts [Regions I & II]. The ones with high cost of searching via informal
contacts chooses the formal methods, which yield a wage that is constant across types [Region
III]. Comparison of the wages in Region III with those in Region I and Region II shows the
nonmonotonicities in wages; that is, search via informal contacts results in for some groups
were the case, then all unemployed workers would use informal search ruling out the formal methods. But this is clearly not the
case as there is a fair mix of formal and informal search across unemployed workers. Some papers, including Pistaferri (1999),
argue that less-skilled workers prefer informal contacts more than skilled workers. But, again, this statement is only partially
true, since it is well known that becoming top managers or finding jobs in top firms/institutions also require strong informal
connections. For example, highly skilled workers tend to offer their skills directly to employers through their connections rather
responding to publicly available opportunities [Heath (1999), Bo¨heim and Taylor (2002)]. Evidently, it is hard to agree on a strict
rule about whether it is in general less costly to search informally or whether workers of a specific skill category necessarily invokes
social contacts more intensively. This suggests that, theoretically speaking, there is considerable (within- and between-group)
heterogeneity in the relative cost of search via informal contacts and it is one of the determinants of who does what in terms of
the method of job search.
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Figure 2.2: Increased heterogeneity. This figure describes the effect of increased inequality in the
distribution of the cost of informal search on wages. The extent of nonmonotonicities—and, thus, the threshold
type—is unaltered in this case, but the wages are pushed out to tails. Clearly, with increased heterogeneity, the
fraction of high wage earners among informal job seekers is larger. Peer effects are ruled out in this example.
higher pay and for some others lower pay than search via formal methods. Notice that the
mass of workers in Region I corresponds to H defined in Section and the mass in Region II
corresponds to L.
The underlying model is a version of the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework with seg-
mented markets and worker heterogeneity. Wages are determined via Nash bargaining in each
sub-market. Informal search is more productive for all workers, although it is relatively more
costly on the right-tail versus the left-tail of the type distribution. So, there is a cost-benefit
tradeoff along this margin. That informal search is more productive (i.e., it yields a higher job
finding rate) reduces the duration of unemployment for those who typically rely on informal
methods. Those who have extremely low cost (i.e., the ones close to the left tail) can tolerate
staying unemployed for a longer time, but firms in those markets will lose output if the job
remains vacant that long. Thus, firms are willing to pay high wages for those workers. In
other words, the strength of one’s connections enters the Nash bargain. This explains Region
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Figure 2.3: Stronger peer influences. This figure shows the effect of stronger peer influences on wages.
The type distribution is unaltered. The red line corresponds to the wage function with weaker peer effects,
while the blue line describes stronger peer effects. As the peer effects become stronger, the degree of nonmono-
tonicities gets larger. Notice that stronger peer effects raise the fraction of low-earners among the informal
job seekers. The threshold type zT shifts to the right.
I. In Region II, the expected duration of unemployment is low, but the workers’ willingness to
wait for the most desirable wage offer to arrive is not as high as the ones on the left tail. As
a result, they compare the wages that they would get had they searched via formal methods
and a lower paying job, in which they expect to stay unemployed for a shorter period of time.
Firms know this, and they offer a lower wage in Region II. Region III resembles the textbook
Mortensen-Pissarides wages. Notice that zT is endogenously determined within the model.
As I discuss in Section 1, there is no consensus about the effect of informal search on wages in
the empirical literature. Some papers find a positive correlation between informal search and
high wages, while others find a negative one. The model I develop in this paper shows that
these two findings can coexist. It is important to understand the conditions under which one
result dominates the other. I argue that changes in the degree of heterogeneity and changes in
the strength of peer influences can have distinct effects. More precisely, in environments with
greater cost heterogeneity, a much larger fraction of workers who find jobs through informal
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search tend to earn higher wages [see Figure (2.2)]. The left-tail becomes fatter, i.e., there
is a transfer from Region II to Region I, which leads to a greater fraction of workers with
stronger informal connections. Therefore, empirical studies based on data sets with greater
heterogeneity will tend to find a positive correlation between using informal search and earning
high wages. With stronger peer effects, on the other hand, a much larger fraction of workers
who find jobs through informal search tend to earn lower wages [see Figure (2.3)]. Greater peer
effects does not alter the distribution of workers, but it affects the extent of nonmonotonicities.
As Figure (2.3) suggests, stronger peer influences increases the fraction of workers who search
informally yet receive lower wages. This is intuitive, because if social forces are more effective
in a region or among a group of people, this will lead to more significant referral effects which
will manifests itself as “live-nearby/work-nearby” pattern. I conclude that data sets for the
regions with large peer effects will tend to yield a negative correlation between using informal
search and earning high wages.
It is important to note that, in the first exercise, I shut down peer influences and focus solely
on the effect of increased heterogeneity on wages. In this case, changes in the type distribution
lead to a change in the wage distribution, but the degree of nonmonotonicities is not altered
since zT is unaltered. Varying the dispersion of cost distribution in the presence of peer effects
alters not only the wage distribution but the degree of nonmonotonicities [see Figure (2.4)].
This makes the case even stronger: a fatter left tail leads to higher wages in Region I, while
the existence of peer effects leads to a slight extension in the degree of nonmonotonicities in
Region II. Next section presents the basic model, in which I shut down peer effects. Section 4
introduces peer influences and discusses how the results of Section 3 are altered in this more
complicated setting.
3 Model
This section introduces an equilibrium job search model in which identical firms post vacancies
in segmented markets to attract workers while heterogeneous job seekers engage in costly
search. Unemployed workers have two job search options: formal search and informal search.
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Figure 2.4: Increased heterogeneity in the presence of peer effects. This figure displays the effect
of increased heterogeneity on wages in the presence of peer influences. The red line corresponds to the wage
function with lower heterogeneity and the blue line is the one with greater heterogeneity. As in Figure (2.2),
the left-tail becomes fatter and the fraction of high earners among informal job seekers goes up. But the
existence of peer effects pushes the threshold type to the right as in Figure (2.3). This finding strengthens
the case: greater heterogeneity increases the fraction of high earners and peer effects raise the fraction of low
earners among informal job seekers.
There is no search on the job. Wages are determined via Nash bargaining in each sub-market.
Such a setup yields analytically tractable equilibrium distributions of wages and unemployment
in the worker population.
It will perhaps be useful to elaborate further on the segmented markets assumption. In
heterogeneous-agent search models, there are two options to formulate the matching technol-
ogy: undirected and directed search. Undirected search formulates the matching function in
terms of the total number of matches being created and then split the matches across types.
Directed search, on the other hand, assumes markets are segmented across types and different
wages belong to different markets. I adopt the segmented markets assumption for two reasons:
(i) for analytical tractability and (ii) with undirected search, the aggregate search intensity
needs to be placed into the matching technology, in which case I would lose track of the sources
of peer effects (i.e., whether peer influences comes from preferences or the matching technology
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would be difficult to separate), which is a critical issue in the model. The segmented markets
assumption removes this concern and enables me to isolate peer effects on wages. The details
of the model and the solution are presented below. For simplicity, peer effects are ruled out
in this section and will be introduced in Section 4.
3.1 Worker Heterogeneity
There is a continuum of workers indexed by z ∈ Z, where Z is the support of worker types.
Workers are risk neutral and infinitely lived. Each worker seeks to maximize the expected
discounted value of labor income, unemployment income, and search effort. Two methods
of job search are available for the unemployed worker: she will either rely only on formal
methods or invoke also her informal contacts. This is a discrete choice model. The binary
discrete variable, D(z), describes the choice of search method for each unemployed worker z.
D(z) = 0 if only formal methods are used and D(z) = 1 if the informal contacts are also
invoked by a worker of type z.
Formal methods are costless for all workers, i.e., the disutility from using only formal methods
is zero for all z.8 But the cost of invoking informal contacts is not necessarily zero and it differs
across workers. It is instructive to interpret this heterogeneous cost as each worker’s proximity
to an informal network. I assume that the cost of using informal channels is distributed around
zero. As a result, some workers have advantages in using informal connections over formal
methods. Similarly, some workers have disadvantages in using informal contacts, which tilt
their choices toward relying on formal methods only. For analytical simplicity, I let z denote
this cost. In other words, workers are indexed by the cost of using informal connections in
job search. The distribution of this cost is denoted by the cumulative distribution function
G(z), which is centered at zero and assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure.
8Setting the cost of formal search to zero can be considered just as a normalization for the purpose of analytical tractability.
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After this description, the period utility for type-z workers, U(z), can be written as
U(z) =
 w(z), if employed,x−D(z)z, if unemployed, (3.1)
where w(z) is the type-specific wage outcome, x is the unemployment income (which is the
same for all workers), and D(z)z is the cost of search effort. Parallel to the definiton of the
discrete choice structure given above, the cost of job search is zero if the unemployed worker
relies only on formal methods, i.e., D(z) = 0, and it equals z if the unemployed worker invokes
also her informal contacts, i.e., D(z) = 1.
3.2 Matching Technology and Turnover
To obtain a clear-cut formulation of the distribution of wages, I assume that firms can direct
their search into a specific sub-market—the market for type-z workers. The job matching
technology in each sub-market z can therefore be written as
m(z) = m
(
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z), v(z)
)
, (3.2)
where u(z) is the rate of unemployment among type-z workers, v(z) is the vacancy rate in the
sub-market z, and s(D(z)) is the market-specific mean efficiency of search methods. Notice
that s(·) is a function of the search method, D(z), preferred by type-z unemployed workers.
In other words, it transforms the search effort into effective units of search.
Since all type-z unemployed workers will make the same choice of the search method, s(D(z))
will be equal to either s(0) or s(1). A natural implication of this formulation is the inequality
s(1) > s(0), which means that relying only on formal methods reduces the efficiency of job
search—relative to invoking also the informal contacts. To simplify the calculations, I let
s(0) = αs(1), where 0 < α < 1.
I assume that the matching technology is of constant returns to scale with positive first-order
and negative second-order partial derivatives. The functional form of the matching technology
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is homogeneous across types. For concreteness, I assume
m(z) =
(
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z)
)η
v(z)1−η, (3.3)
where 0 < η < 1. A Poisson process transfers the workers from unemployment to employment
with the transition probability for type-z unemployed workers
q(z) =
m
(
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z), v(z)
)
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z)
=
(
v(z)
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z)
)1−η
. (3.4)
Following the conventional notation, I let θ(z) = v(z)/s
(
D(z)
)
u(z) to denote labor market
tightness for type-z workers, which allows me to write
q(z) = θ(z)1−η. (3.5)
Another Poisson process transfers the jobs from being vacant to filled in sub-market z with
the transition probability
qf (z) =
m
(
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z), v(z)
)
v(z)
=
(
s
(
D(z)
)
u(z)
v(z)
)η
, (3.6)
which can, again, be rewritten as
qf (z) = θ(z)
−η. (3.7)
Notice that q(z) and qf (z) are related by
q(z) = θ(z)qf (z). (3.8)
Let γ be the exogenous rate at which job destruction shocks arrive. Standard calculations
yield that, at the steady state, the equilibrium unemployment rate for type-z workers is given
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by
u(z) =
γ
γ + θ(z)1−η
, (3.9)
which means that the aggregate rate of unemployment, u, in this economy can be calculated
with the formula
u =
∫
Z
γ
γ + θ(z)1−η
dG(z). (3.10)
The interpretation is the following. There are two distinct values that the tightness parameter
can take in each sub-market: θ(z) = θ(z, 1) if D(z) = 1 and θ(z) = θ(z, 0) if D(z) = 0. Clearly,
θ(z, 1) < θ(z, 0); that is, the rate of unemployment for types who rely only on formal methods
is higher than those who invoke also their informal contacts. The aggregate unemployment
rate is a weighted average of these high and low rates. There exists a threshold type zT that
determines this weight. The types z < zT have cost advantage and they choose D(z) = 1 in
the equilibrium, whereas the types z > zT choose D(z) = 0. It is easy to see that the discrete
choice structure allows me to write
u =
∫ zT
−∞
γ
γ + θ(z, 1)1−η
dG(z) +
∫ ∞
zT
γ
γ + θ(z, 0)1−η
dG(z). (3.11)
In other words, those who search only via formal methods (i.e., z > zT ) face a higher unem-
ployment rate, whereas those who invoke also informal methods (i.e., z < zT ) face a lower
unemployment rate. The aggregate rate of unemployment is a simple integral over the type
horizon. In the rest of this section, I describe a solution strategy for zT .
3.3 Workers’ Problem
Let r > 0 denote the rate of interest. The present discounted value from unemployment, for
a worker of type z, is
rVu(z) = x−D(z)z + θ(z)1−η
(
Ve(z)− Vu(z)
)
(3.12)
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and the present discounted value from employment, for a worker of type z, is
rVe(z) = w(z) + γ
(
Vu(z)− Ve(z)
)
. (3.13)
Clearly,
Ve(z) =
w(z) + γVu(z)
r + γ
. (3.14)
As a result,
Vu(z) =
(r + γ)
[
x−D(z)z]+ θ(z)1−ηw(z)
r
[
r + γ + θ(z)1−η
] (3.15)
and
Ve(z) =
γ
[
x−D(z)z]+ [r + θ(z)1−η]w(z)
r
[
r + γ + θ(z)1−η
] . (3.16)
3.4 Firms’ Problem
Let Wo(z) be the present-discounted value of expected profit from an occupied job and Wv(z)
the present-discounted value of expected profit from a vacant job in market z. Let the value
of the job’s output when it is filled be p, where p > 0 is fixed.
The asset value of an occupied job, Wo, satisfies the Bellman equation, for a given wage w(z),
rWo(z) = p− w(z)− γWo(z) ⇒ Wo(z) = p− w(z)
r + γ
. (3.17)
The firm’s expected profit from one more job vacancy is
rWv(z) = −pτ + θ(z)−η
(
Wo(z)−Wv(z)
)
, (3.18)
where pτ > 0 is the fixed hiring cost per time unit. Imposing the well-known equilibrium
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condition Wv(z) = 0, for all z, I get
Wo(z) = pτθ(z)
η. (3.19)
Combining the equations (3.17) and (3.19) gives
p− w(z)− (r + γ)pτθ(z)η = 0. (3.20)
3.5 Wage Determination
I derive the wage rate via a Nash bargaining solution; that is, w(z) maximizes the weighted
product of the type-z worker’s and the firm’s net return from the match. The wage rate
satisfies
w(z) = arg max
(
Ve(z)− Vu(z)
)χ(
Wo(z)−Wv(z)
)1−χ
(3.21)
where 0 ≤ χ < 1 is a constant and may be interpreted as a relative measure of labor’s
bargaining strength. Note that χ has to be strictly smaller than 1 for the firms to have an
incentive to open a job. The first-order condition can be expressed as
Ve(z)− Vu(z) = χ
(
Wo(z) + Ve(z)−Wv(z)− Vu(z)
)
, (3.22)
which, by substituting Ve(z) and Wo(z) in, can be converted into the following wage equation:
w(z) = rVu(z) + χ
(
p− rVu(z)
)
. (3.23)
Using the formula for Vu(z), I derive the final wage equation
w(z) = (1− χ)[x−D(z)z]+ χp[1 + τθ(z)]. (3.24)
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To simplify the notation, I normalize s(1) = 1, which makes s(0) = α, where 0 < α < 1. I
retain this assumption in the rest of this chapter. Obviously,
w(z) =
 (1− χ) [x− z] + χp
[
1 + τθ(z, 1)
]
, if D(z) = 1,
(1− χ)x+ χp[1 + ταθ(z, 1)], if D(z) = 0. (3.25)
3.6 Optimal Choice of the Search Method
The unemployed worker of type z chooses D(z) = 1 over D(z) = 0 if Vu(z, 1) > Vu(z, 0).
Therefore, Pz|u
[
D(z) = 1
]
= Pz|u
[
Vu(z, 1) > Vu(z, 0)
]
. The notation z|u means that the
probability statement is conditioned on being unemployed; that is, I calculate the probability
of choosing 1 over choosing 0 among those who are unemployed. Using the formulas derived
above,
rVu(z, 1) =
(r + γ) [x− z] + θ(z, 1)1−ηw(z)
r + γ + θ(z, 1)1−η
. (3.26)
The unemployed worker takes the firms’ actions as given when making her own choice of the
search method. From (3.20),
w(z) = (1− χ) [x− z] + χp[1 + τθ(z, 1)] (3.27)
when D(z) = 1. Therefore,
rVu(z, 1) =
[
r + γ + θ(z, 1)1−η(1− χ)] (x− z) + χpθ(z, 1)1−η[1 + τθ(z, 1)]
r + γ + θ(z, 1)1−η
. (3.28)
Similarly, when D(z) = 0, the wage equation becomes
w(z) = (1− χ)x+ χp[1 + ταθ(z, 1)], (3.29)
which implies that
rVu(z, 0) =
[
r + γ + α1−ηθ(z, 1)1−η(1− χ)]x+ χpα1−ηθ(z, 1)1−η[1 + ταθ(z, 1)]
r + γ + α1−ηθ(z, 1)1−η
. (3.30)
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Following the choice rule, Pz|u
[
D(z) = 1
]
= Pz|u
[
Vu(z, 1) > Vu(z, 0)
]
it is easy to show that
Pz|u
[
D(z) = 1
]
= Pz|u [z ≤ Ψ1x+ Ψ2χp] , (3.31)
where I set
Ψ1 =
χ(r + γ)θ(z, 1)1−η(α1−η − 1)[
r + γ + α1−ηθ(z, 1)1−η
]× [r + γ + θ(z, 1)1−η(1− χ)] (3.32)
and
Ψ2 =
θ(z, 1)2−ητ(r + γ)
[
1−α1−η
τθ(z,1)
+ (1− α2−η) + α1−η(1−α)
r+γ
θ(z, 1)1−η
][
r + γ + α1−ηθ(z, 1)1−η
]× [r + γ + θ(z, 1)1−η(1− χ)] . (3.33)
It is straightforward to prove that Ψ1 < 0 and Ψ2 > 0. The probability statement (3.31) is
actually a mean. There is an analogous expression for Pz|u
[
D(z) = 0
]
. But it will disappear
in calculating the mean since it will be multiplied by zero. Equation (3.31) says that the
mean behavioral outcome is determined by two major factors: (1) pecuniary incentives during
unemployment, x, and (2) the productivity of each filled vacancy multiplied by the worker’s
share in wage bargaining, χp.
The main result that this section communicates is the existence of nonmonotonicities in wages,
as Figure (2.1) suggests.9 Regarding the model mechanics, the reason for these nonmonotonic-
ities is the differences among workers in terms of their tolerence to wait for a good offer to
arrive. Firms in each sub-market compare wage payments to foregone production and extend a
wage offer. The most well-connected type receives the best wage, but the least well-connected
one does not receive the lowest wage. Clearly, there exists a thereshold type, below which
informal search is chosen and above which workers conduct formal job search. There are some
intermediate workers, who earn lower than the formal job seekers. Those intermediate types
prefer a lower pay with shorter expected unemployment durations to a higher pay with longer
9The assigned parameter values are as follows: γ = 0.2, χ = 0.5, α = 0.7, τ = 0.7, c/p = 0.75, r = 0.05, and η = 0.5.
These are the institutional parameters and they are fixed throughout the analysis. These parameters are chosen to match the
7% vacancy rate and 10% rate of unemployment in the United States. The baseline parameters for the cost dispersion σ = 1
(i.e., the variance of the distribution G) and the social interactions (or peer effects) parameter J = −1. In Figure (2.2), the cost
dispersion is increased to σ = 1.5 (the bold distribution curve) and, in Figure (2.3), the peer effects parameter is changed to
J = −3 (stronger peer effects denoted with the blue wage schedule).
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durations of unemployment.
Figure (2.2) demonstrates the effect of increased cost dispersion. Clearly, with greater cost
heterogeneity, the fraction of high wage earners among informal job seekers goes up. This
suggests that environments with greater cost disperison tend to produce results favoring a
positive correlation between informal search and getting high-paying jobs. Notice that the
wage structure is unaltered in this exercise, although the wage distribution changes. For the
dispersion parameter to have an impact on the wage structure, one needs to introduce peer
effects into the model, since in such a setup individuals will care about the distributional
features of the worker types.
Next subsection develops a model in which peer effects matter. It provides a discussion of these
results, links them to the figures introduced in Section 2, and incorporates peer influences to
the model to see how the basic results are altered.
4 Wage Differentials and Peer Influences
The model I construct in this section accounts for the possibility that a change in the distri-
butional properties of individual-level heterogeneity may affect the wage distribution. Again,
for simplicity, I work with mean-zero normal distributions, but the parameter governing the
dispersion of the distribution is no longer restricted to be 1 and it is denoted with σ. The
purpose is to study the effect of a change in σ on the distribution of wages and, therefore, on
the degree of nonmonotonicities. An increase in σ can be interpreted as increased inequality.
The model in this section is, therefore, capable of answering questions regarding the effect of
increased inequality in informal connections on the distribution of wages.
An easy way to let the workers care about the changes in the type distribution is to introduce
peer effects into the model. In such a setup, the search method choices of other workers in the
reference group will affect the individual-level decision making. A common way to formulate
peer effects in this fashion is to use the “preference interactions” framework developed by
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Schelling (1971, 1973, 1978).10 This framework inserts a group-level variable into preferences
to let the workers respond to social incentives.
Within the context of this model, the fraction of unemployed workers invoking informal con-
tacts in job search affects the cost of search. To reflect this view, I reformulate the period
utility as follows:
U(z) =
 w(z), if the worker is employed,x−D(z)(Jλ+ z), otherwise, (4.1)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the “endogenous” fraction of unemployed workers choosing D(z) = 1
and J < 0 describes the strength of peer influences. More precisely, what others do affects
individual-level choices in this formulation; that is, the fact that a lot of unemployed workers
choose D(z) = 1 versus D(z) = 0 tilts my choices also toward choosing D(z) = 1. The
coefficient J measures how strong the social forces are. Notice that this is a special case of the
discrete choice with social interactions framework developed by Brock and Durlauf (2001a)
and extended to the job search environment by Tumen (2011, 2012).
I, again, embed this structure into the Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium search model with
segmented markets. There are two points that one needs to pay attention. First, λ is an
endogenous object. Second, λ should be calculated within the reference group (i.e., the pool
of unemployed), which is itself endogenous. As in the earlier version, there will be an threshold
type, zT , below which everyone uses informal search and above which formal search is preferred.
Thus, λ can be calculated as follows:
λ =
1
u
∫ zT
−∞
[
D(z)
∣∣(D(z) = 1)× u(z)]dG(z), (4.2)
where D(z)|(D(z) = 1)× u(z) is the type-specific fraction of those who choose D(z) = 1.11
The solution of this version is the same as that of the previous version except that the wages
10See Manski (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2001b) for extensive reviews of the literature. See also Young (1996) for a
straightforward conceptual motivation.
11Remember that all members of a given type z display homogeneous behavior.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium solution for λ. This figure describes the outcome of the fixed-point solution I use
in determining λ. The underlying equation is (4.5). Clearly, in this specific example, around 33% of workers
find jobs through informal contacts at the steady state. This is given by the intersection of the 45-degree line
and the conditional probability function.
can now be formulated as:
w(z) =
 (1− χ)
[
x− (Jλ+ z)]+ χp[1 + τθ(z, 1)], if D(z) = 1,
(1− χ)x+ χp[1 + ταθ(z, 1)], if D(z) = 0. (4.3)
The only difference is the emergence of Jλ in the wages of those who choose to invoke informal
methods.
The determination of λ is the key to the analysis presented in this section. As in Section 3,
The unemployed worker of type z chooses D(z) = 1 if Vu(z, 1) > Vu(z, 0). The fraction of the
unemployed workers who choose to search informally is, therefore,
Pz|u [D(Z) = 1|λ] = Pz|u
[
Vu(z, 1) > Vu(z, 0)|λ
]
= Pz|u [z ≤ Ψ1x+ Ψ2χp+ Ψ3Jλ] . (4.4)
This is the analogue of Equation (3.31). The only difference is that the fraction of unemployed
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workers who choose to search informally, λ, also affects the choice of the search method. Self
consistency requires that
λ = Pz|u [z ≤ Ψ1x+ Ψ2χp+ Ψ3Jλ] , (4.5)
which can be solved for λ using a standard fixed-point argument. The left-hand side is a
45-degree line and the right-hand side is a cumulative distribution function (or, equivalently, a
conditional expectation function). Figure (4.1) visualizes the solution of this fixed-point prob-
lem for the parameter values provided in Section 3. Notice that the conditional expectation
is a function of the dispersion of worker types, σ. After pinning down λ, one can vary σ and
analyze the effect of a change in the distribution properties of the labor force on the wage
distribution, and, therefore, on the differentials between the wages paid by the jobs found
through informal versus formal search.
Figure (2.3) displays the results of playing with J . More precisely, J is changed to -3 from
-1. Obviously, stronger peer effects operate at the low end of the earnings for the informal job
searchers. This suggests that peer effects are most effective for low-skill workers. Thus, with
stronger peer effects, the wages paid to informal job searchers tend to be lower than the wages
paid to formal searchers. Now suppose that the dispersion of the cost distribution goes up in
the presence of peer influences [see Figure (2.4)]. Similar to the predictions of the model with
no peer effects, increased cost dispersion raises the fraction of high earners. But the existence
of peer effects raises the fraction of low earners too. This result makes the case even stronger.
The interpretation is as follows. Think of a neighborhood most of the residents of which work
in a large nearby factory. This live-nearby/work-nearby patterns are usually associated with
blue-collar occupations and poor neighborhoods. If the norm is to search informally, then J
will take a large negative value implying strong peer influences in the choice of job search
methods. In other words, peer influences will reduce the cost of informal search and induce
the workers rely mostly on referrals in job search.
Bringing the results of Sections 3 and 4 together, I conclude that—for those who choose to
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search informally—heterogeneity operates among high earners, whereas peer effects operate
among low earners. The main result is that in environments with greater cost heterogeneity
informal search tend to yield higher wages than formal search, while in environments with
strong peer effects the opposite statement tends to be true.
5 Concluding Remarks
There is a divide in the empirical literature investigating the correlations between earnings and
informal networks: some papers find positive correlation between getting help from informal
contacts in job search and higher wages, while others find a negative correlation. This paper
proposes a unifying theoretical model constructed for the purpose of comparing the wage
outcomes associated with informal versus formal job search channels in a general equilibrium
setup. The model is a version of the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium search model
with segmented markets, worker heterogeneity, and peer influences in job search. Wages are
determined via Nash bargaining in segmented markets and a wage distribution arises in the
equilibrium. Whether a worker has strong informal connections or not enters the Nash bargain
and plays a critical role in wage determination.
More specifically, the paper features four main results. First, the equilibrium distribution of
wages exhibit nonmonotonicities. These nonmonotonicities communicate the idea that the
jobs found through informal methods pay for some groups higher and for some others lower
wages than the jobs found through formal methods. This finding reconciles the seemingly
conflicting empirical findings about the effect of informal search on wages. Second, as the
worker types become more dispersed (i.e., as the inequality in terms of low-cost access to
informal networks goes up), the correlation between using informal job search and getting
high-paying jobs tends to be positive. Third, as peer effects become stronger, the correlation
tends to be negative. As a result, the model disentangles the forces operate at the higher end
versus the lower end of the wage distribution.
The model’s predictions communicate the lesson that the extent of unobserved heterogeneity
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and strength of peer effects determine the correlation between earnings an informal contacts.
This result can be translated into the following criticism: the empirical papers in the literature
fail to successfully control for unobserved heterogeneity and peer effects in their estimates. This
conclusion informs the empirical research in the sense that identification of the true correlation
between job contact methods and wage offers requires a careful assessment of the unobserved
heterogeneity and peer influences in the relevant sample.
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